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HOW AMERICAN DEMOCRACY CAN THRIVE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Heymann, Philip B., and Juliette N. Kayyem, eds. Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2005. 194pp. $30

In the midst of a cacophony of charges
and countercharges concerning recently
revealed warrantless U.S. government
wiretaps of American citizens, this
compact book strikes a refreshing
note—calm, balanced consideration of
the tension between security and liberty
in the post-9/11 world. The editors, a
Harvard Law School professor and an
acting executive director for research at
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, convened a group of experts in a
variety of professional terrorism-related
fields to explore “how American democracy can thrive best” in the war on
terror. Over eighteen months, the experts (from both ends of the political
spectrum and many with previous U.S.
or British government service) developed specific criteria to guide future decisions concerning the law and practice
applicable to combating terrorism at
home and abroad.
Happily, the book’s detailed recommendations for the executive branch
and Congress reject extremes in favor
of a thoughtful balance between the
president’s need for extraordinary powers and Congress’s duty to provide

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:36:37 AM

oversight. The recommendations cover
ten major areas that include coercive
interrogations, indefinite detention,
targeted killing, intercepting communications of U.S. persons, information
collection, and identification of individuals. Any bias in the approach is, as the
authors acknowledge, toward accountability, transparency, and accurate reassessment. On the other hand, the
recommendations refrain from suggesting guidelines or restrictions on the
commander in chief’s broad war powers in zones of active combat outside
the United States.
This work is particularly useful for
readers who are or will be addressing
terrorism-related issues within the executive or legislative branches. The recommendations provide a possible path
to broad consensus on these contentious topics. Readers ideologically committed to an extreme viewpoint (in
favor of either maximum security or
maximum liberty) will find much to
criticize, while those who seek a balanced
approach, though they will also take issue,
may find that adopting the moderate
viewpoint of the recommendations will
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enhance more rapid agreement among
the various stakeholders in the
government.
The work’s one drawback is a lack of
detail, in that it reflects a “distillation of
views and opinions” based on “honest
and difficult discussions” in a series of
closed-door meetings. Accordingly, the
reader must speculate on the rationale
underlying the specifics. Those seeking
to implement these recommendations
would benefit by a clearer understanding of the viewpoints analyzed and why
they were resolved in a particular way.
For example: What indicators of reliability were presumed to prohibit the
introduction of information obtained
through “highly coercive interrogation”
techniques in a trial of the informing
detainee but to allow the information in
the trial of other detainees? What value
is served by providing an individual
captured in a zone of active combat a
hearing before a competent tribunal
when there is no doubt as to his/her
status as a prisoner of war? What competing legal rationales were considered
when concluding that an al-Qa‘ida
leader located in Yemen was not engaged in “active” combat against the
United States?
This criticism is minor, in any event,
since executive and congressional leaders must answer these questions for
themselves and on behalf of the American public, if the recommendations are
implemented. The book’s value lies in
modulating the shrillness of the discourse and in proposing a reasoned,
rational way forward for the ultimate
benefit of the nation.
JANE G. DALTON

Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law
Naval War College
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Purkitt, Helen E., and Stephen F. Burgess. South
Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2005. 322pp. $24.95

North Korea’s prime motive for developing and possessing nuclear weapons
is probably regime security. Leader Kim
Jong-Il’s rationale would be that absent
weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
the international community would
find some way to dismantle a repressive,
autocratic regime that is completely out
of phase with twenty-first-century norms.
Authors Helen Purkitt and Stephen
Burgess argue in their analysis of South
Africa’s weapons of mass destruction
programs that in the latter part of the
twentieth century the white ruling elite
made similar calculations, premised on
idiosyncratic political ideology and national emotions as much as on rational
neorealist power assessments. South Africa’s nuclear, biological, and chemical
capabilities (unilaterally abandoned by
the mid-1990s, after majority rule was established and Cold War threats had receded) arose from its white leaders’ alarm
over rising regional threats unleashed by
decolonization, détente, and corresponding American timidity vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union in Africa, and growing international opposition to apartheid.
The book is analytically sound if somewhat inelegantly written. The authors—
Purkitt, a professor of political science
at the U.S. Naval Academy, and Burgess,
an assistant director of the U.S. Air
Force Counterproliferation Center as
well as an associate professor at the U.S.
Air War College—systematically illuminate South Africa’s furtive route to
clandestine WMD know-how and arsenals. Steps included exploitation of
South Africa’s own natural resources
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(uranium), dual-use technology, porous arms-control regimes, and technologically advanced states that perceived
themselves as comparably besieged (for
instance, Israel and Taiwan). Careful
not to oversimplify, the authors also
note the organizational, personal, and
cognitive factors that enforced this effort. Pertinent circumstances included,
respectively, the desire of the Defense
Ministry and military to maintain maximum control over the national industrial
base; the friendship between chemical
and biological weapons czar, Dr. Wouter
Basson, and Prime Minister P. W. Botha;
and the Afrikaners’ conception of themselves as “God’s chosen people.”
Marring the book’s narrative flow is an
awkward structure whereby overlapping themes are examined discretely.
This produces considerable redundancy
and, occasionally, the obtuse presentation of old information as new material.
More aggressive editing would have
remedied the problem, which in any
case is ameliorated by an appendix of
policy lessons. Despite its faults, however, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction embodies an assiduous and
authoritative marshaling of facts about
one country’s secret enterprise in acquiring weapons that, without benefit
of hindsight, few might have expected it
to covet. Purkitt’s and Burgess’s work
also contrasts the halcyon days of
nonproliferation immediately after the
Cold War ended—when South Africa
was a “trendsetter” for wider disarmament—with the present dysfunction of
nonproliferation regimes. South Africa’s
conversion to a majoritarian democracy
facilitated benevolent neorealist behavior. Grimly, the authors note, however,
that “today’s states that have weapons
of mass destruction are not likely to
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replicate South Africa’s democratic disarmament.” Dutifully, they sketch how
nonproliferation incentives and measures will have to change in order to
stop the spread of WMD. The book,
then, has more than just historical relevance; it should be considered a timely
as well as an accomplished contribution
to the nonproliferation literature.
JONATHAN STEVENSON

Associate Professor of National Security Affairs
U.S. Naval War College

Kaplan, Robert D. Imperial Grunts: The American
Military on the Ground. New York: Random
House, 2005. 421pp. $27.95

Robert Kaplan’s book Imperial Grunts
is an account of a war journalist cum
travel writer visiting U.S. military commands worldwide. Kaplan travels
through “barracks and outposts of the
American Empire,” from Yemen to Colombia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa,
introducing readers to “imperial grunts”
(U.S. Marines and Army troops and the
Navy and Air Force personnel who support them) at these forward-deployed
locations. His ten previous books include foreign affairs accounts (Soldiers
of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Vintage, 2001)
and travelogues (Surrender or Starve:
Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and
Eritrea, Vintage, 2003). Kaplan is currently a correspondent for the Atlantic
Monthly.
Kaplan lauds the personal initiative of
midlevel commissioned and noncommissioned officers he meets in his travels,
and he champions them as, collectively, a
superior source for operational knowledge
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and force mentorship. A recurring
theme is the failure of a top-heavy bureaucracy of “big military/Army/Navy”
that is “organizationally miscast for
dealing with twenty-first-century insurgencies,” versus smaller, more efficient
Marine, special forces, and civil affairs
units. One example is the transformation of “big military” control over the
Afghanistan battlefield. In 2001, master
sergeants were empowered to call in
B-52 airstrikes that arrived within minutes; by 2003, approval of task force
concepts of operations required three
days of paperwork and senior-officer
authorization.
Kaplan holds out the ethnic composition and language skills of U.S. Southern Command personnel as exemplary.
He posits that, for the twenty-first century, “indigenous culture must be appreciated before anything can be
accomplished with its inhabitants” and
that “cultural and historical knowledge
of the terrain is more likely than technological wizardry to dilute the so-called
fog-of-war.” Kaplan states that in Afghanistan the “American Empire . . . was
weakest” because of an absence of linguistic skills among deployed military
personnel. “This . . . neglected part of . . .
defense ‘transformation’ . . . had nothing
to do with the latest weapons systems.”
According to Kaplan, future military
operations should optimally leave small
footprints. In the Philippines, he observes, Army civil affairs teams, part of
the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, functioned like relief charities or
nongovernmental organizations—they
built schools, dug wells, and provided
medical assistance. These personnel
“represented the future reality of Special Operations: the Peace Corps with
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guns, the final articulation of unconventional war.”
Contrary to media reports of poor military morale due to overdeployment,
Kaplan states that “with Army Special
Forces and the Marines I had met only
two kinds of troops (from 2002–2004):
those who were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, and those who were jealous
of those who were” and “those in the
Special Operations community whom I
had met (in the Philippines) and in
eastern Afghanistan were having the
time of their lives.”
Imperial Grunts is intended to be the
first of several books on “imperial
maintenance on the ground, and seeking a rule book for its application.” The
strong opinions of the author notwithstanding, those desiring to learn about
military personnel deployed worldwide
in the war on terror can benefit from
reading this account.
ZYGMUNT F. DEMBEK

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve

Parrish, Thomas. The Submarine: A History. New
York: Penguin, 2004. 576pp. $17

In this excellent and rather lengthy
book, Thomas Parrish uses detailed vignettes to illustrate how submarines,
the men who operated them, and the
organizations that produced them
changed naval warfare between great
powers during the twentieth century.
The author does this with a deft hand,
providing a wealth of details concerning
many notable personalities and technical facts of his arcane subject in a way
that both informs and entertains. One
has only to read the first three pages,
which quickly discuss the short and
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tragic life of the Confederate submarine
CSS H. L. Hunley, to get an accurate
feel for how the rest of the book will
progress. Parrish maintains this fast
pace as he relates the legend of David
Bushnell’s Revolutionary War submersible vessel, the Turtle; Robert Fulton’s
submarine efforts; and those of other
early inventors. His discussions on
World War I are more substantial, and
his penchant for detail emerges in his
short biographies of some of the major
figures of the time. He ties their careers
to submarine technology, not only describing Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s
rise to high command in the German
navy but quoting the admiral’s observation that his success was bound to the
development of the torpedo. Parrish
then traces the development of both the
German and British fleets and the grand
strategies that led to their acquisition.
For the next ten pages, we are told the
riveting story of how Lieutenant Otto
Weddigen, commanding the sixhundred-ton submarine U-9, with a
crew of twenty-six men, sank the British cruisers Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue
with just three torpedoes in less than
two hours in the early days of the war.
In that battle 1,459 British men died,
which at the time represented the worst
butcher’s bill, and arguably the most
stunning defeat, in the history of the
Royal Navy. As Parrish later observes, the
century of the submarine had arrived.
Parrish treats his discussion of World
War II equally well. He relays, among
other things, Admiral Karl Dönitz’s
rise, U-47 commander Lieutenant
Günter Prien’s attack in Scapa Flow, the
U.S. Navy’s participation in convoy escort duty before the official declaration
of war, and the second Battle of the Atlantic. He discusses the parallel Allied
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and German code-breaking efforts and
the action/reaction technology cycle between submarines and those who
hunted them. Readers with an interest
in the U.S. submarine force’s contributions to victory against Japan will be
pleased with the author’s treatment of
that important campaign and of the
major figures involved.
If the book has a weakness, it is that
some important points receive scant
coverage. All told, nearly four hundred
pages of the book discuss the history of
diesel-powered submarines, while only
eighty-four pages are dedicated to nuclear boats. Yet even here the author
does a creditable job in describing the
development of American nuclear submarines, evenhandedly discussing the
rise, behavior, strengths, and weaknesses of Admiral Hyman Rickover.
Oddly, Russian submarines receive little
attention, most of it devoted to peacetime losses of the Komsolomets (the
Mike-class submarine) in 1989 and that
of the Kursk (an Oscar II) in 2000.
Submarine accidents also present the
few stumbling points. Parrish states
that all hands were lost when HMS
Thetis sank in 1939, when in fact three
members of the crew and a shipyard
worker escaped from the stricken submarine. Similarly, he describes the USS
Scorpion as “shabby and seedy” and
“rickety,” citing these alleged characteristics as contributing to its loss. However, these oversights are relatively
minor and do not significantly detract
from what is otherwise a fine treatment
of a complex subject. The book will appeal to the interested layman, naval
professional, and, especially, to current
and former submariners.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY

U. S. Naval War College
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Showalter, Dennis E., ed. Forging the Shield:
Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st
Century. Chicago: Imprint, 2005. 236pp. $24.95

Dwight D. Eisenhower’s greatest
achievement as president came in the
area of foreign policy and related defense matters. In the making and managing of strategic policy he was a strong,
active, and effective leader. This book is
an uneven collection of essays devoted
to Eisenhower’s presidential influence
on foreign policy and national security,
essays that were presented at a symposium held in January 2005 at the National Defense University.
The lead paper, “Reflections on Eisenhower, the Cold War, and My Father,”
by Sergei N. Khrushchev, provides an
interesting recollection of Nikita
Khrushchev’s attitude toward Eisenhower and the United States. According
to Sergei Khrushchev, a Brown University professor and himself a veteran of
the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, his
father, like many veterans of the “Great
Patriotic War,” viewed Eisenhower as a
former comrade in arms and thus welcomed his election as president. The elder Khrushchev was highly respectful of
the danger posed by potential nuclear
war and sought only equality in relations
with the United States and the Eisenhower administration. Questions emerge
as to how much new information Sergei
Khrushchev’s memoir-analysis reveals,
and how much is a son’s defense of a
father. However, to a large segment of
students, Professor Khrushchev’s reflections provide an interesting look at the
key foreign power’s opposing viewpoint
during the Eisenhower presidency.
The collection’s strongest work is Alan
Millet’s “Eisenhower and the Korean
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War.” It was a conflict that Eisenhower
inherited when elected and one that he
knew he had to end. Millet traces Ike’s
indirect involvement from the period
when he was chief of staff after World
War II until his pledge in the 1952 campaign that if elected “I shall go to Korea,”
a pledge that Eisenhower understood
needed rapid redemption.
With considerable insight Millet traces
Eisenhower’s efforts to end the war and
provide a defense policy for the long
haul, based on concepts that Ike later
set forth in his memoir. These concepts
relied on deterrence, stressed the role of
nuclear technology, placed heavy reliance on allied land forces around the
Soviet periphery, and emphasized economic strength through reduced defense budgets. The outcome was the
New Look strategy of the 1950s.
R. Cargill Hall’s essay, “Clandestine
Victory,” is a competent account of the
development of increasingly sophisticated aircraft and early satellites tasked
with aerial surveillance and of the intelligence they provided, as well as of their
influence on decision making. However, the paper deteriorates into an argument for further eye-in-the-sky
commitments to counter twenty-firstcentury terrorism. Hall’s argument
seems more public relations for an institutional constituency than a reasoned
scholarly analysis and conclusion. Terrorism, at its most effective and frightening, depends on surreptitious
individual initiatives that in general
defy large-scale overhead surveillance.
One area that perhaps could have been
developed more explicitly is Eisenhower’s role and technique in controlling the defense budgetary process and
strategic dialogue within his administration. His principal secretaries of

6
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defense were functionalists, and Eisenhower viewed their primary role as one
of keeping the Pentagon programs
within the budget, which was important
for carrying out his conservative fiscal
goals. On strategic matters, Eisenhower
dealt directly with the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus usurped
an important portion of the secretary of
defense’s role. He respected his secretaries as businessmen but in effect insisted on being his own secretary of
defense.
Thematic throughout this collection is a
focus on Asia and Europe. By stressing
Eisenhower’s response to grand strategy,
relations with Moscow, the interrelationship of politico-military-industrial
and techno-scientific affairs, and trouble spots in Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia, the book ignores the
twenty-first-century challenges posed
for contemporary U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Southern Hemisphere—Africa and Latin America.
For the sophisticated and knowledgeable scholar, Forging the Shield likely
contains little new information, but it
will prove valuable to defense policy
and military history students needing
exposure to the Eisenhower era.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

author of President Eisenhower
and Strategy Management

Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Politics,
Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 1868–1922. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2005. 283pp. $57.95

Charles Schencking, in charting Japan’s
creation of the world’s third-largest
navy by 1922, illuminates the workings
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of the Japanese political system and the
evolution of both interservice rivalries
and civil-military relations in the decades preceding World War II. He bases
his history on an impressive reading of
Japanese and English-language primary
and secondary sources to produce a
story with political implications far beyond the history of one service.
When the Meiji reformers took power
in 1868, their minimal naval forces
were part of their land forces. In 1871,
over the objections of the army, the
Military Ministry was subdivided into
two ministries, army and navy. In order
to secure funding to create a modern
fleet, the navy soon allied with the Satsuma clans, while clans from ChÇshÇ
were already allied with the army.
Together these clans brought the Meiji
reformers to power. The opening of the
Diet in 1890 brought fears among the
clans that democracy would erode their
power. Therefore, they solidified their
ties with the army and navy. Thus
highly politicized interservice rivalries
were inherent in the Japanese political
system.
Initial Diets were hostile to military
funding. War with China in 1894–95,
however, transformed the public perception of the navy from a financial
burden into a service vital to Japan’s
national security and domestic prosperity. This, combined with the large war
indemnity from China, produced massive naval budgetary increases. The naval mission expanded from defense of
the home islands to command of the
sea and defense of the empire. The
navy continued to press for a combat
mission independent of the army,
which retained responsibility for national defense and command over
naval forces in wartime. Interservice
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rivalries intensified. The navy assiduously cultivated popular support
among politicians, journalists, disenfranchised former samurai, and entrepreneurs who dreamed of an empire in
the South Seas.
The navy used World War I to seize
German colonies and implement its
“southward advance” strategy for expanding the empire in the Pacific region. The war also transformed Japan
from a debtor into a creditor nation.
These changed circumstances finally allowed a Seiyãkai-navy alliance to deliver
greatly increased postwar naval budgets. Previously, the naval budget had
occasionally exceeded the army budget,
but from 1917 to 1922 it did so consistently and massively.
In response to those who believe that
Japan’s military muzzled its civil leaders
in World War II and that this accounts
for Japan’s rampage through the Pacific, Schencking’s book shows that the
political parties had always worked
closely with the military and that, conversely, the military had always been
deeply involved in politics. This meant
ever-deepening interservice rivalries,
and also incomplete and incompatible
war plans that would spell disaster for
Japan and much of Asia and the Pacific
in World War II.
For nonspecialists, additional allusions
to political and budgetary issues beyond
naval appropriations would have put
the subject of the book into a broader
context. Nevertheless, Schencking provides one of the best descriptions of the
inner workings of the Japanese political
system that I have ever read. It details the
creation of the modern Japanese navy, the
civil-military politics necessary for its development, the consequent army-navy
rivalries, and the implications for the
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Japanese political system and for future
Japanese military strategy.
S. C. M. PAINE

Strategy and Policy Department
Naval War College

Black, Jeremy. The British Seaborne Empire. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2004. 420pp. $40
Jeremy Black deliberately titled his book
to link it with two classics, works that
every maritime historian knows: C. R.
Boxer’s The Dutch Seaborne Empire
(1965) and J. H. Parry’s The Spanish
Seaborne Empire (1966). The planned
volume in that series that would have
provided an overview of the British
Empire was never completed, although
nearly twenty years later D. B. Quinn
and A. N. Ryan filled the gap for the
early phase with their England’s Sea
Empire, 1550–1642 (1983). Black’s contribution shows a significantly different
approach as well as a much broader and
more nuanced view of the general theme.
Jeremy Black is a prolific writer who
has become widely known for his
broad, sweeping histories of British foreign policy in the eighteenth century
and of the history of European and
world warfare, as well as for his insightful studies of maps and cartography. He
is fully experienced and eminently well
qualified to attempt a broad-based
study such as this.
Although Black’s title suggests a general
history of the British Empire, his detailed focus is not on the earliest period
but on the three hundred years from
the Union of Scotland and England in
1707 to the present. To provide linkages,
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however, he has written a hundred
pages that describe the origins of the
empire, racing from pre-Roman times
to the mid-eighteenth century. From
that point forward, Black expands out
into his larger study, tracing both the
British Empire’s rise and its decline. In
this Black is careful to give weight to
the three elements of his title: the
“Britishness” of that empire, the complexity of its maritime basis, and the
distinctive differences with other types
of imperial powers. The book is a dense
collation of factual detail, but the picture that Black paints and the perspective that he presents are interesting. He
links maritime exploration, trade, migration, and naval affairs in a broad
context while at the same time bringing
in the wide range of cross-cultural issues involved. Even beyond that, Black
characterizes the British Empire as the
power that gave indirect rise to America
and was America’s immediate predecessor as a global superpower. This linkage,
as Black reminds us, allows a reader to
begin to think about the connections
between consecutive global powers.
Imperial history has largely been ignored until recently in academic circles,
but Black’s work clearly succeeds in underscoring the importance of the British Empire’s maritime nature in its
distinctive contribution to the development of the modern world. Black concludes that “if the British Empire is
blamed for many of the aspects of modernization and globalization, it also
serves as a way of offering historical
depth to a critique of American power,
and, in part, this is at issue when British
imperialism is criticized.”
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Naval War College
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Budiansky, Stephen. Her Majesty’s Spymaster:
Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth
of Modern Espionage. New York: Penguin, 2005.
235pp. $24.95

For many years the U.S. intelligence
community has been dominated by a
subculture enraptured with intelligence
collected by technical means. Despite
the wealth of intelligence these means
provide, they do not always lead toward
an understanding of how an opponent
thinks. Many current and former intelligence officers have argued for over a
decade that the United States must improve both its human intelligence and
counterintelligence capabilities; events
since 9/11 have reinforced that view
with a vengeance.
History provides many examples of effective intelligence organizations in the
days before technical means, and Stephen
Budiansky, a journalist and military
historian, has chosen for his subject one
of the best for his latest book. Budiansky
describes the intelligence successes of
Sir Francis Walsingham, first as ambassador to France and later as Principal
Secretary to the Privy Council of Queen
Elizabeth I. In the latter role (at the time,
akin to a chief of staff) Walsingham not
only coordinated domestic and foreign
policy but ran the kingdom’s primary
secret service.
Walsingham was a legend in an era
filled with men of legendary stature.
Where others were self-promoting, he
was unobserved. Where many bragged
of power and connections, he wielded
power quietly and subtly, but always effectively. His painstaking attention to
detail and his deep understanding of
human nature made him the ideal
spymaster.
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The focus of “Mr. Secretary’” (as he was
known) was maintaining England’s independence from the maneuverings of
Spain, France, and Rome. Budiansky
describes how Walsingham’s skill in
gathering and analyzing information
complemented (if not always easily)
Elizabeth’s talent for political and diplomatic intrigue. England, at the time a
small fringe state tottering between
Protestantism and Catholicism, was
vulnerable to the machinations of the
great powers of the day. Walsingham
played critical roles in countering plots
against Elizabeth, the most famous being that of Mary, Queen of Scots.
Walsingham’s role in the defeat of the
Spanish Armada provides a textbook
example of what intelligence can and
sometimes cannot provide. He developed a comprehensive collection plan
and employed a network of agents
throughout Europe to gather information. He never blindly trusted any one
source, using multiple agents against
the same target. As the Armada preparations came to a head, Walsingham
commissioned naval reconnaissance
missions of key Spanish ports, and although his work provided strategic
warning to the crown and the Royal
Navy, contrary winds prevented tactical
warning.
Walsingham understood that intelligence must support decision making—
after all, he was a major player in both
domestic and foreign policy—and ensured that the information he provided
was focused on those ends. Upon becoming Principal Secretary, he was informed that the job required him to
know everyone and see everything. By
the time of his death, both his supporters and enemies believed him unsurpassed in this regard.
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While Walsingham’s network did not
survive him (he left no written legacy
for his successors to follow), the memory of his effectiveness lives on.
If this book has a fault, it is the lack of
discussion on Walsingham’s impact on
later incarnations of the British secret
service. Nonetheless, several maxims attributed to him remain sound guidance
for today’s intelligence and policy professionals. “Knowledge is never too
dear” speaks for the value of good intelligence. “An habit of secrecy is both
policy and virtue” reminds us that success requires constant effort. Finally,
“See and keep silent” remain watchwords for today’s intelligence professionals, as they were in the past.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Berube, Claude, and John Rodgaard. A Call to the
Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005. 299pp.
$35

Charles Stewart was one of the preeminent officers of the early sailing navy.
He is best remembered for the brilliant
victory he gained over HMS Cyane and
Levant as captain of USS Constitution
during the War of 1812. Less well known,
however, are the significant contributions Stewart made to the sea service
over the remainder of his career—a career that witnessed the birth, growth,
and evolution of the Navy during its
first six decades of existence. As a central figure of the formative period in the
Navy’s history, Charles Stewart has long
merited greater scholarly attention than
he has heretofore received.
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In A Call to the Sea, Claude Berube and
John Rodgaard redress this neglect with
the first book-length study of Charles
Stewart’s life. Both Berube, a Brookings
Institution LEGIS Fellow, and Rodgaard,
an intelligence analyst, are Navy Reserve officers with numerous historical
publications to their credit. Their portrait of Stewart is drawn from a range of
secondary sources, as well as research in
manuscript collections that document
the public and private dimensions of
the 1812 hero’s career.

and relationships, in particular his
troubled marriage to Delia Tudor of
Boston, which ended in divorce in 1828.

A Call to the Sea examines the major
personalities, places, and events that
shaped and defined Charles Stewart’s
life, from his birth in Philadelphia on
28 July 1778 to his death ninety-one
years later at Bordentown, New Jersey.
Among the career highlights that
Berube and Rodgaard explore are
Stewart’s participation in three wars
(the Quasi-War with France, the Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812); his
service as commander of the Mediterranean, Pacific, and home squadrons; his
role as a naval administrator, first with
the Board of Navy Commissioners and
later as commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard; and his consideration
as a presidential candidate in the elections of 1840 and 1844. The authors
also shed light on Stewart’s private life

A Call to the Sea is an informative biography of one of the antebellum Navy’s
most intriguing and distinguished officers. As such, it should appeal to a wide
general audience. Naval historians,
however, may well be disappointed with
this work. Berube and Rodgaard have
failed to exploit fully the large body of
official papers that document Stewart’s
sixty-two-year naval career, some of
which are readily available in print.
This, coupled with the authors’ overreliance on secondary sources in assessing Stewart’s life, has resulted in a
biography lacking in critical rigor and
fresh interpretive insights. For this reason, the definitive biography of Charles
Stewart remains to be written.
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Berube and Rodgaard have produced a
biography that is highly favorable to its
subject. The authors give Stewart high
marks as a combat commander, as a
mentor influential in shaping the Navy’s
junior officer corps, and as an administrator receptive to the technological and
social changes that were altering the
face of the Navy during the second
quarter of the nineteenth century.

CHARLES BRODINE

Naval Historical Center
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